INTRODUCTION
      Theodore Kisiel begins the section of  his Genesis of being and Time entitled"  What did Heidegger find in Aristotle," by giving a preliminary answer to his own question:  "( Heidegger) first found a remarkable affinity between his own original phemmenolological resreaches and Aristotle's texts, in method as well as in content." (228)  I think  Kisiel understates the remarkableness of the affinity here.  It's not simply with Aristotle's method  and  content as seperate, but related  entities,  which provokes Heidegger's affinity, but more preciely and remarkably, the  way that Arisrtotle's method folds into his content, one might even say  becomes the content such that what Kisiel calls the " dynamized facticity of life" is made present in the texts themselves as method. In Aristotle, Heidegger found a philsopher whose way of proceeding, whose way-making in philosophy, was as radically phenomenological as his own. I would suggest therefore, that rather than " What did Heidegger find in Aristotle," Kisiel might have more aptly titled this section, "How did Heidegger find himself in Aristotle?" I would then give my preliminary answer  as follows:" In his reading of Aristotle, Heidegger finds  himself already in the midst of philosophy ,  moving with Aristotle on the way to philosophy's becoming what it is. " It is this communicated possibility of moving-with  that enables Aristotle's texts, when appropriately encountered, to open up  onto a "living present" in which the philosophical tradition may be joined as an ongoing practice.
     In the so called "Introduction to Aristotle" of 1922, Heidegger reveals the underpinnings of this phenomenological sense  of philosophy as a "moving with" that he encounters in Aristotle. It is in the Physics that Heidegger finds the basic Aristotelian innovation that guides his reading : "The central phemonenonon, whose explication is the theme of the Physics, becomes the being in the how of its Being-moved." Philosophy shares with physics this focus on the how of the being moved of its object of investigation. But in the case of philosophy, at least as Heidegger conceives of Aristotle's conception of it, the object of investigation is its own "how" as a basic movement of factical life. Thus by its very nature philosphy is faced with a conflation of the  object of investigation with its method of approaching that object, both apparently occupying the same space in the being-in-the-world of philosophical dasein. Insofar as philosophy separates itself, tries to distinguish itself from its own basic factical dynamic, it becomes, in Heidegger's words " ent-leben."  By striving to establish some "scientific distance" from itself as  object, philosophy cuts itself off from its own way of being, its own factical movement as what it is.
     But How does philsophy find its way into its own ongoing  factical movement?  That is, how can philosophy situate itself in its already being underway, without  pulling back from that very being underway and thus  objectifying itself?  This is precisely the "methodological problem" that Heidegger identifies as his major precoccupation in GA 56-57:    John Van Buren frames the methodoligical problem as the search for  "a type of non-objectifying language that would allow one to speak about and yet precisely preserve the "mystery"  in the  movement of this groundless absence-permeated, incalculable and diffrentiating matter of thinking." ( 157) Heidegger sees the methodological problem as linguistic,  really  rhetorical in the common and basic sense of "how to say. . .how to put something"  The answer, I will argue, is likewise rhetorical—  in this case, a rhetorical approach to the problem of saying the how of philosophy's being moved as a moment in the already being underway of that  movement.  I will propose that Heidegger's rhetorical approach to the problem of how to speak philosophically takes the form of the formal indication.  Of course he didn't call this central methodological innovation of the early twenties "rhetorical,"(That would have violated  Aristotle's advice to the speaker  to conceal the the artfulness of his rhetoric within the folds of   his speech), but I believe it is best understood so.
     In order to think through this possibility I will examine those texts, mostly from the early twenties, in  which  Heidegger seems to most explicitly indicate the essentially rhetorical work of the formal indication.  At another level ( at least I think it's another level) I will use the formal indication as a way to read Heidegger reading Aristotle, that is my paper itself will develop its own line of argument as a response to a series of formal indications I find in  Heidegger .

THE WAY OF THE FORMAL INDICATION
     The way of the formal indication begins with—is ground in—the thing itself: That is, the object of investigation, whose formal qualities  serve as the originary indication of a saying whose form then indicates the way to a further saying which indicates the formal way to further saying and so on.  This way of proceeding from the object of investigation as the source of the originary indicative saying, which then spawns a series of further indications, is perhaps most fully and at the same time most succintly realized in the late work, Was is das Die Philosophie, where,  after establishing that  Philosophy "spricht jetzt griechisch" ( that the word philosophy  speaks Greek) Heidegger proceeds to unfold a series of formally indicative sayings derived from (I want to say heard in) the originary Greek saying of philosophy as "philosophia."   But that's another path of formal indications for another paper.
     The first indication in our present investigation that I want to call attention to (that seems to call my attention to it) on  the way to understanding what it means to  think philsophy in the how of its being moved, is in the very formally suggestive 1922 ms. already alluded to, translated as "Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle:  Indications of the Hermeneutical Situation. " Early in the essay   Heidegger says the following:

The fixing of the basic attitude regarding interpretation grows out of the explication of the sense of philsophical research.  Its object was defined in indicative fashion as factical human dasein as such.The concrete specification of the philosophical problematic is to be derived from this its object. For this reason, a first preliminary highlighting of the specific character of factical life becomes necessary. But not only because it is the OBJECT of philosophical research, but also because philosophical research itself constitutes a determinate how of factical life. . .  (360)

This first indication firmly fixes the direction of philosophical research retroflectively focused on itself, on its own factical life , as the object of its investigation. As part of this fixing, we  also see in play here, another essential constituent step in the method of the formal indication.which  Heidegger calls " Einstellung auf vieldeutigkeit, "  the fous on ambiguity, a term suggested to him by an indication he finds in  Aristiotle:  " pollaxus legomenon".  It seems to work this way in the text before us :  The  first indication highlights the ambiguity between  philosophy itself as both the object and method of research. It is soon followed by another indication which brings a focus to the ambiguity  just fixed, preparing the formal way for the next indication, which will continue to drive the investigation deeper into the space of ambiguity established by the original indication.  The crucial second indication I find on the following page of the essay.  Picking up on the terms "philosophical research" and "factical life," in the context just spoken, as defining the formal space in which the investigation is to proceed, Heidegger highlights the severe tension within the  ambiguity he means focus on:

"Philosophical research is the explicit actualization of a basic movement of factical life and maintains  itself always within factical life."

 This formally indicative saying of the hermeneutical situation, in which philsophy finds itself, calls for an explicit and uncomprimizing realization of the inextricacble intertwining of philosophical  method with its own  facticity as the object of methodogical inquiry. This realization requires that philsophy look with a focused intensity at  the central ambiguity in its own  factical life, that is the deep factical conflation within philosphical Dasein of the investigating subject with its object of investigation.  It is only in the course of a determined focus on this central ambigutiy wherein philsophy can discover the  determinate how of its own being-moved. In  other words, the only way that philosophy can perform the requisite task of finding  itself alreardy underway  is by   observing the movement of its own factical life from within itself. The relationship of philosophical dasein to its own facticity might be characterized, somewhat anachronistically perhaps, as that of "participant observer."  It is as  particpant observer in/to its own factic movement that philosophy comes to its own peculiar Umsicht, as Heidegger calls its , its "take," as it were, on its own facticity.
 
 

THE PHILOSOPHICAL "UMSICHT"
In respect of this circumspective take on its own facticity, philosophical Dasein is not unique.  Dasein's facticity generally lends itself to — really  encourages—a circumspective  looking at itself, a circumspection which to a substantial degree determines the indivualized form that facticity takes as a particular mode of Being -in-the -world.  In other words, Dasein's facticity provides the formal indications  which point the way to the realization of its ownmost potentiality for being. But what is unique to philosophy—that is how philosophical dasein  distinguishes itself from the facticity of Dasein in  its general everydayness, and thereby makes philosophy what it is—is the particular Umsicht which philsophy assumes in relationship to  its own facticity as the object of its concernful dealings (362). In  the how of its own factical being moved, philosophical Dasein radicalizes the concern which constitutes  Umsicht  in general to the point where its concern becomes "eine Bekuemmerung"(359), a worrisome preoccupation with facticity. This worrisome preoccupation "over-illumates" the object of its concern, namely its own facticity, to the point where the how of its being moved  comes to light, becomes accessable.  In its becoming accessable to the Umsicht of philosophy, factical dasein shows itself to be firmly rooted in everydayness. In its everydayness, or more precisely  from within the  already interpreted quality of its everydayness, Dasein begins to compose (itself), to piece together, the Umsicht within which its factical life moves.  To maintain itself within itself as a basic movement of factical life,philosophy must rigorously keep its linkages to the facticity of everydayness firmly in its sight, for those linkages form the raw material out of which philosophy forms its own particular determinative Umsicht.
 
ENTER ARISTOTLE
Here Heidegger finds perhaps his most important connecting link to Aristotle, especially the Aristotle of the Rhetoric.  In Aristotle's Rhetoric Heidegger finds the equivalent for philosophy of the basic how of its being moved, thematized in the Physics for "basic science." Philosophy for Aristotle grounds the how of  its being moved in the over-illumnation of the salient characteristics of everyday being with one another:

(note:  The following is from p. 41 of SS 1924.  I think it belons here; I've yet to integrate it)

"Rhetoric is nothing other than the interpretation of concrete Dasein (Die Rhetorik is nichts anderes als die auslegung des konkreten Daseins die Hermeneutic des Dasein selbst)  That is the intended sense of rhetoric for Aristotle:  Speaking in the manner of the speaking -in-speech ( Das sprechen in der Weise des Sprechens-in-der-Rede) : public meetings before the court, by celebratory epidiectic.   These possibilties of speaking are  determined conspicuous cases of  ordinary speaking."
 

As Heidegger observes in Being and Time: "

 "Contrary to the traditional orientation according to which rhetoric is conceived as the kind of thing we " learn in school," this work of Aristotle must be taken as the first sytematic hermeneutic of everydayness of Being with one another."

The central focus of that hermeneutic for both Heidegger and Aristotle is, of course, moods.  The concernful dealings through which we enact our Being-in-the-world are grounded in our "bemooded attunement" ( bestimmte Gestimmtheit, I think Hediegger would call it) to the objects of our concern.  But Aristotle's exhautsive hermeneutic of the  emotions in Book II of the Rhetoric is not an end in itself.  For while "Understanding always has a mood," as Heidegger puts it, moods themselves are a propedeutic to speech ,  as Book Two of the Rhetoric on the emotions is a propedeutic to Book Three on the how of  actual speaking— the rhetoric of Artistotles' Rhetoric, so to speak.  But what is the philosophical relationship between  Aristotle's "hermeneutic of everyday life "composed as a treatise on the emotions in Book II,  and the material on the actual how of rhetorical practice  in Book Three and to a great extent in Book I?  Is philosophy merely  one bemooded dasein, in the person of the professor, forming his speech so as to suit another bemooded dasein: namely, his students? In other words, is philosophy just another rhetorical phenomenonology, just another how of being moved from mood to speech, or does it merit, perhaps even require, privileged status
as a master discourse?
     The answer of course is an ambiguous "both," and with the infamous first sentence of the Rhetoric, Aristotle indicates that that very ambiguity will serve— indeed must serve—as the formal framework for his distinctive view of rhetorical practice.  That first sentence reads, "Rhetoric is the antistrophos of dialectic. " I leave the connective which formally indicates the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic untranslated in order to highlight the focus on ambiguity that the term evokes, thereby indicating the form of what follows.   Antistrophos metaphorically suggests a kind of mirroring or echoing here. (George Kennedy observes in his commentary on the Rhetoric that " In Greek choral lyric, the metrical pattern of a strophe or stanza is repeated with different words in the antistrophe." In the following few sentences,  Aristotle goes on to focus the ambiguity of the antistrophos further  by elaborating the ways in which rhetoric and dialectic proceed in parallel voices .  Furthermore, when we recognize that the text before us itself represents a series of lectures spoken by a reknowned philosopher about rhetoric, the antisprophos  in the first senetence widens its focus to the ambiguity between philsophy and rhetoric as a subtext of the lectures. It follows from this initial indication  that somehow in,—or perhaps through—  the manner of Aristotle's speech  in what follows, philosophy will  show itself most evidently and most explicitly as a basic movement of factical life   But this showing, though related to the rhetoric of Dasein's everyday factical Being-with, is not itself isomorphically identical with everyday speech, the apparent subject of the text.  That is, the rhetoric, the way of speaking, the way of philsophizing in Aristotle's Rhetoric, must show itself  phemenologically as a species of everyday Being-with, but at the same time, its speech must distinguish itself in the how of its own being moved, as  philosophical speech.
      I read Heidegger in SS 1924 as performing the same delicate phenomenological dance in the space between  philosophy and rhetoric, as Aristotle performs in the Rhetoric itself.  (The next few sentences are meant to be a clartifying gloss on what I just said, but are not quite there yet.)  I am proposing that we read the 1924 lecture course as following the same path of formal indications that Heidegger reads Aristotle as following in the Rhetoric itself.  Both lecture courses uncover and disclose the distinctive how of philsophy's being moved in and through the  formal indications each takes from Dasein's everyday factical being-with,  and turns into a philosophical Dasein. Furthermore, the saying of philosophy in Heidegger's course is itself a reading of Aristotle's formal indication:  A philosophical Umsicht  presented as a formally indicative perspective on a philosophical Umsicht. .  A parallel look at the all important  beginnings of the two as indicating the formal  frame for what follows  will serve to bring the mirroring dance of the two texts into ambiguous focus.

THE RHETORIC
 As already noted, Aristotle begins his work with the ambiguous suggestion that Rhetoric is the Antistrophos of Dialectic. As George Kennedy observes in his translation and commentary on the Rhetoric , this first sentence, by its form and its relationship to what follows, announces itself (anzeigesich ?) as an enthymeme. , That is, the first sentence of Aristotles' Rhetoric  itself exemplifies,  embodies, the central trope in Aristotle's whole system, namely, the enthymeme.  To further focus the  ambiguity here,  before we have any further indications of what the enthymeme is, Aristotle asserts a few sentences later that the "Enthymeme is the body of persuasion. " Now whatever else rhetoric might be, it does eventuate—  finds its end in— persuasion, yet all we are given at this point is only  the vaguest indication of the formal embodiment of that end, of what the enthymeme looks like and sounds like in an actual speech.  But because this vaguest of indications of what the enthymeme is, appears as the first sentence of Aristotle's lecture, we are led to assume that in this first sentence, "The enthymeme is as the enthymeme does."
 So what does this first sentence do?  By focusing on a significant ambiguity— in this case the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic (May I now say "philosophy?)—this first sentence means to provoke the audience into a questioning— a hermeneutical questioning if you will ( pace  Gadamer)— and thus join the speaker in the questioning the speaker means to pursue in the speech.  Thus the rhetorical function of that first sentence is to open a space wherein the relationship between rhetoric and philosophy will enthymematically—that is with the cooperation of the audience— be thrown into question.  But this throwing into question is not completely open-ended.  The very focus on the ambiguity of the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic indicated by the word " antistrophos" goes against the conventional view of the relationship, by suggesting the possibility of a parity, even an identity:  Perhaps philosophy is—or has the capacity to be—rhetoric in its finest form.
 On this reading, the revolutionary thesis of the work is that philosophical rhetoric, the saying of philosophy, is rhetoric par excellence, that is, rhetoric in its most fully realized form, rhetoric in its arete.  As a consequence of this opening claim, Aristotle ( and later Heidegger) must assume the weighty pretense that becomes necessary when a philosopher takes on his own facticity as a subject: As itself a basic movement of factical life, philosophy must display the how of its being moved, its distinctive bemooded attunement, in the rhetorical quality—that is the effect— of its own speaking.  Heidegger indicates this same pretense as a concommitant of philosophy in a key passage in his course on Plato's Sophist:

 In opposition to the sophist, the dialectician and the philosopher are determined by the fact that they take that about which they speak seriously, they intend their speech to bring about an understanding of the content, whereas the sophist pays no attention to the substantive content of his speech but is simply  concerned with the speech itself, its apparent reasonableness and its brilliance.( 150).

 Putting the claim  in phenomenological terms,  we may say that the seriousness of philosophical intent would show itself  in the speech of the philsopher, by means of  the capacity of  the speech to make evident, to "show" in a way that can be clearly seen, that the speaker goes beyond the mere appearance of brilliance and reasonableness, to truly bring about an understanding  of the matter at hand: In this case that rhetoric is   the antistrophos  of philosophy.  It is through the use of the enthymeme as the rhetorical embodiment of its argument, that rhetoric becomes the antistrophos  of philosophy.  Through the enthymeme, rhetoric rises above the level of "mere rhetoric," taught in the  handbooks that Aristotle criticizes, and achieves  a level of significance parallel to that reached through dialectic.  Understood in this way, the first sentence of Aristotle's Rhetoric becomes a formal indication of the hermeneutical reach that is possible through the dunamis  of rhetoric, a dunamis  that philosophy shares with everyday speech.  The enthymeme here begins to assume philosophical significance, and opens up a space wherein the how of philosophy's being moved may be conceived as a distinctive rhetorical phemomenology, by identifying a distinctively philosophical deployment of the enthymeme.
 It follows that the "philosophical enthymeme,"  especially the philosophical enthymeme enacted in Heidegger and Aristotle, will project the questioning that is the essence of philosophy into its way of speaking.  Philosophical speech, as rhetorical arete , will connect the dasein of professor with the dasein of the student in the how of their being moved, namely by the profoundly serious questionablity of the question.  And of course, this transmission of a way of being moved is embodied in a pathos   in which philsophy is enacted as a "how" of being moved  on the way to speech ( Was ist das die Philosophie).  The professor "doing philosophy" must enthymatically embody that bemooded movement in his speech.  This is Heidegger's sense of Aristotle's text as offering a being- with on the way to philosophy— a shared focus on the ambiguity of philosophical dasein's facticity as embodying both the object of its investigation and its method for investigating its object.
 In his recent book, The Hermeneutics of Original Argument, Chistopher Smith notes that Heidegger himself argues that the link to pathos  is the distinguishing mark of the enthymeme as over against the dialectical syllogism:
 
We could say accordingly that the dialectical syllogism is already aimed at the intellect of someone looking on , a theoretes, whereas the rhetorical enthymeme is aimed at the practical will of someone participating in what is happening ( a phronemos ?). The one seeking to bring someone to the point of saying, "yes, I see this is so," the other seeks to bring someone, to engage someone, in saying "yes, I will do this."  ( 29)

Through the enthymematic connection offered to them in the first sentence, Aristotle asks his students to join  with him in the philosophical work of the Rhetoric: namely, to throw into question the relationship between philosophy and rhetoric as traditionally conceived, and reconstitute that relationship as an antistrophos.  This reconstitution will take the form of  philosophy as a virtuoso rhetorical performance,  and will emerge enthymatically through the students' ( and subsequent readers') participation in the construction of the discourse.  Once again, the enthymeme in the first sentence "is, as it does":  The thesis, " Rhetoric is the antistrophos  of dialectic," will show itself to be the case through the capacity of the text to " make it happen."

SS 1924
 Let us now look at the opening moments of SS 1924 to get a sense of  the parallel enthymematic dance performed by Heidegger on the first say of the course.  The course was officially titled " Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie,"  (Basic Concepts of Aristotle's Philosophy).  But as was his wont, Heidegger begins by performing the title as an "erasure"—putting a Derridean line through it— by telling his students not only that the course would not proceed according to the title, but that such a project would not be appropriate to the teaching of philosophy, as Heidegger conceives of it:

Die Vorlesung hat garkeine philosophische Abzweckung, es handelt sich um das Verständnis von Grundbegriffen in ihrer Begrifflichkeit; die Abzweckung ist philologisch, sie will das lesen von Philosophen etwas mehr in Uebung bringen.

The lecture does not have any sort of a philosophical purpose, but rather it deals with the comprehension of the basic concepts in their conceptuality.  The purpose is philologic; it (the purpose) intends to make the reading of (works by) philosophers a more common practice.
 
The way to properly  philosophize being indicated here is a practice that Heidegger claims is "not philosophy," but rather  "philology," which would seem to be a way of attending to the surface contours of the words themselves.  Yet this approach is intended to yield access to the deepest possible meaning of the words—going deeper than even the concepts themselves  to reach the "concepts in their conceptuality. "
 Imagine, if you will, the students coming to class the first day, expecting to hear a professor, with a growing reputation as an expert of Aristotle, teach them Aristotle's basic concepts.  Their expectation is warranted by what seems like a rather conventional and straightforward title.  The reasonable flow of this expectation from the title, to the course, is severely interrupted by Heidegger almost immediately: He turns the title back on itself as a questioning— an interrogation of Aristotle's basic concepts. The so called  basic concepts are merely the face—the sur-face—of the matter for thinking in the text.  They serve to indicate the way for the questioning that comprises the real work of thinking.  The professor ( with the partiocipation of the students as we will soon see) means to "ask after" the true "Grund" of Aristotle's "Grundbegriffen"  and thereby to seriously bring those basic concepts  to understanding by seeing them in their relationship to their conceptuality.  Such a seeing must be enthymematic— a shared endeavor between professor and students.
 Heidegger is here enacting  philosophical dasein as a mode of Being-with.  As mode of Being-with, the professorial philosophical dasein cannot simply present  the students with  Aristotle's basic concepts as an already completed and packaged discourse.  That might be  philosophy as usually spoken, but for  Heidegger that would be philosophy as sophistry—  presenting the students with  "merely brilliant speech" which gives  the appearance of teaching Aristotle's basic concepts, without  seriously working to " bring about understanding." Here Heidegger distinguishes himself from the merely brilliant sophist just as Aristotle did, by the rhetorical seriousness of his intent.  But how can Heidegger as rhetor-teacher get the students to take on the seriousness of this project with him in order to bring about its successful completion as philosophical discourse?
 He proceeds by laying down a few "prerequisites" (Voraussetzungen) for the course-as-philsophical-project.  His first rhetorical move in this direction is to equate the seriousness he wishes the students  to take on with the predominant academic value of the day, namely science:

 Conceptuality" he tells his students, "makes up the substance of all scientific research, and conceptuality is not merely an acquired technique ( Scharfsinn),"  but a profound personal commitment: "That the one who has chosen science has taken over the responsibility for the concept (a matter that is lost today).

 Here Heidegger's construction of the enthymematic relationship appropriate to serious philosophy begins to assume religious overtones, to resemble what would later be called " The piety of thinking."  Notice in the following "prerequisite," how Heidegger adds  a weighty moral  dimension to the assumption of responsibility he has just placed upon his students: "  ( We must assume)that we are not so advanced that there would be nothing more that we need to be told, that in some regard, something is still wrong with us." And finally he deepens the personal, religious nature of the obligation with the last of the prerequisites:

 Science is not an occupation, nor a trade, nor a pleasure, but rather the possibility of human existence.  This is not something that one lands upon by chance or coincidence, but rather it carries within itself certain prerequisites, which one must possess, insofar as one moves earnestly within the environment of that which is meant by scientific research.

  By making a certain choice, by taking on a certain set of commitments,  the students with Heidegger  can realize a possibility of human existence .  And so the enthymematic rhetoric of  Heidegger's teaching provides the " Bildung" for philosophical dasein's realization of its ownmost potentiality for being (the professor's as well as that of the students) .  Thus, it is on the way to  Being that this joint venture of reading Aristotle under Heidegger's direction, as a search for the "conceptuality of the basic concepts"— the "from which" and "toward which" of the philosophical tradition — leads us.

NOTE:  This is not the end of the paper.  I have a "peroration" in the works which links my argument up to Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche's Zarathustra, especially the passionate invocation:  " I teach you the Uebermensch!"  I will conclude by suggesting that Heidegger/Aristotle/Nietzsche formally indicate through their philosophical rhetoric—their way of speaking philosophically— that philosophy as rhetorical arete is spoken as a  passionate teaching, a "Torah," if you will.
 
Aside from that, you have here the basic shape of my argument.  I hope to hear from you. Thanks again  for taking a look at the paper in this raw stage.

COMMUNICATE WITH SCULT  at
allen.scult@drake.edu