Die Vorlesung hat garkeine philosophische Abzweckung, es handelt sich um das Verstaindnis von Grundbegriffen in ihrer Begrifflichkeit; die Abzweckung ist philologisch, sie will das lesen von Philosophen etwas mehr in Uebung brinegn. Eine solche Absicht steht naturgemaess unter einer Anzahl von Voraussetzungen: Sie sind derart dass es fraglich ist, ob man sich in einer Verlesung ueberhaupt darauf einleasen kann: 1) erste Voraussetzung, da gerade Arist. etwas zu sagen hat, da alsogerade Arist. Gewuenlt wird und nicht Platon, Kant oder Hegel; dass ihm also eine ausgezeichnete Stellung nicht nur innerhalb der griechischen, sondern der gesamten abendlaendischen Philosophis zukommt. 2) dass wir alle noch nicht so fortgeschritten sind, dass wir uns nichts mehr haeten sagen zu lassen, dass es mit uns in irgendeiner Hinsicht nicht stimmt. 3) dass die Begrifflichkeit: die Substanz jeder wissenschaftlichen Forschung ausmacht, dass Begrifflichkeit keine Sache von Scharfsinn ist, d.h. dass der, der die Wissenschaft gewaehlt hat, die Verantwortlichkeit fuer den Begriff uebernommen hat (eine haute abhanden gekommene Sache). 4) Wissenschaf ist kein Beruf, kein Erwerb, kein Vergnuegen, soder die Moglichkeit der Existens des Menschen, nicht etwas, in das man zufaellig hineingeraten ist, sondern sie traegt in such bestimmte Voraussetzungen, die man aber mit zubringen hat, sofern man sich im Ernat im Umkreis dassen bewegt, was wissenschaftliche Forschung besagt. 5) das mensch. liche Leben hat in sich die Moeglichkeit, sich einzig auf sich selbst Zu stellen, auszukommen ohne Glauben, ohne Religion unddergl. 6) ein methodische Voraussetzung: den Glauben an die Geschichte in dem Sinne, dass wir voraussetzen, dass Geschichte und geschichtliche Vergangenheit (sofern ihr nur die Bahn Freigemacht wird), die Moeglichkeit hat, einer Gegenwart oder besser Zukunft einen Stoss zu versetzen.
The lecture does not have any sort of a philosophical purpose, but rather it deals with the comprehension of basic concepts in their conceptuality. The purpose is philologic, it (the purpose) intends to make the reading of (works by) philosophers a more common practice. Such an intention naturally can only exist under a number of prerequisites/assumptions: These assumptions are such that it is debatable as to whether or not one can get involved in them in a lecture.
First assumption. That specifically Aristotle has something to say, that he is the one who was chosen and not Plato, Kant or Hegel, that he therefore isdeserving of an honored position not only in the Greek philosophy, but rather in the entire Western philosophy.
2 That we are not so advanced that there would be nothing more that we need to be told, that in some regard, something is still wrong with us.
3. That conceptuality makes up the substance of all scientific research, that conceptuality is not a matter of astuteness (acumen), In other words that theone who has chosen science has taken over the responsibility for the concept (a matter that is lost today).
4. Science is not an occupation, nor a trade, nor a pleasure, but rather the possibility of human existence. This is not something that one lands upon by chance or coincidence, but rather it carries within itself certain prerequisites, which one must possess, insofar as one moves earnestly within the environment of that which is meant by scientific research.
5. Human life has in itself the possibility to depend only upon itself, to manage without faith, religion and the like.
. 6. A methodologiical assumption: Faith in history in the sense that we assume that history and historical past (insofar as the way is made clear) have the possibility of dealing a blow, setting a present or better future in motion.
The six prerequisites are an unreasonable demand—but we are only carrying out philology after all. Philosophy has a better position today, insofar as itgrows out of a basic assumption that everything is alright, is in order. I would like to call Aristotle as a witness for the delimitation of the way that we will deal with philosophy here.
The course was officially titled " Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie," (Basic Concepts of Aristotle's Philosophy). But as was his wont, Heidegger begins by performing the title as an "erasure"–putting a Derridean line through it– by telling his students not only that the course would not proceed according to the title, but that such a project would not be appropriate to the teaching of philosophy, as Heidegger conceives of it:
Die Vorlesung hat garkeine philosophische Abzweckung, es handelt sich um das Verständnis von Grundbegriffen in ihrer Begrifflichkeit; die Abzweckung ist philologisch, sie will das lesen von Philosophen etwas mehr in Uebung bringen.
The lecture does not have any sort of a philosophical purpose, but rather it deals with the comprehension of the basic concepts in their conceptuality. The purpose is philologic; it (the purpose) intends to make the reading of (works by) philosophers a more common practice.
The way to properly philosophize being indicated here is a practice that Heidegger claims is "not philosophy," but rather "philology," which would seem to be a way of attending to the surface contours of the words themselves. Yet this approach is intended to yield access to the deepest possible meaning of the words–going deeper than even the concepts themselves to reach the "concepts in their conceptuality. "
Imagine, if you will, the students coming to class the first day, expecting to hear a professor, with a growing reputation as an expert of Aristotle, teach them Aristotle's basic concepts. Their expectation is warranted by what seems like a rather conventional and straightforward title. The reasonable flow of this expectation from the title, to the course, is severely interrupted by Heidegger almost immediately: He turns the title back on itself as a questioning– an interrogation of Aristotle's basic concepts. The so called basic concepts are merely the face–the sur-face–of the matter for thinking in the text. They serve to indicate the way for the questioning that comprises the real work of thinking. The professor ( with the partiocipation of the students as we will soon see) means to "ask after" the true "Grund" of Aristotle's "Grundbegriffen" and thereby to seriously bring those basic concepts to understanding by seeing them in their relationship to their conceptuality. Such a seeing must be enthymematic– a shared endeavor between professor and students.
Heidegger is here enacting philosophical dasein as a mode of Being-with. As mode of Being-with, the professorial philosophical dasein cannot simply present the students with Aristotle's basic concepts as an already completed and packaged discourse. That might be philosophy as usually spoken, but for Heidegger that would be philosophy as sophistry– presenting the students with "merely brilliant speech" which gives the appearance of teaching Aristotle's basic concepts, without seriously working to " bring about understanding." Here Heidegger distinguishes himself from the merely brilliant sophist just as Aristotle did, by the rhetorical seriousness of his intent. But how can Heidegger as rhetor-teacher get the students to take on the seriousness of this project with him in order to bring about its successful completion as philosophical discourse?
He proceeds by laying down a few "prerequisites" (Voraussetzungen) for the course-as-philsophical-project. His first rhetorical move in this direction is to equate the seriousness he wishes the students to take on with the predominant academic value of the day, namely science:
Conceptuality" he tells his students, "makes up the substance of all scientific research, and conceptuality is not merely an acquired technique ( Scharfsinn)," but a profound personal commitment: "That the one who has chosen science has taken over the responsibility for the concept (a matter that is lost today).
Here Heidegger's construction of the enthymematic relationship appropriate to serious philosophy begins to assume religious overtones, to resemble what would later be called " The piety of thinking." Notice in the following "prerequisite," how Heidegger adds a weighty moral dimension to the assumption of responsibility he has just placed upon his students: " ( We must assume)that we are not so advanced that there would be nothing more that we need to be told, that in some regard, something is still wrong with us." And finally he deepens the personal, religious nature of the obligation with the last of the prerequisites:
Science is not an occupation, nor a trade, nor a pleasure, but rather the possibility of human existence. This is not something that one lands upon by chance or coincidence, but rather it carries within itself certain prerequisites, which one must possess, insofar as one moves earnestly within the environment of that which is meant by scientific research.
By making a certain choice, by taking on a certain set of commitments, the students with Heidegger can realize a possibility of human existence . And so the enthymematic rhetoric of Heidegger's teaching provides the " Bildung" for philosophical dasein's realization of its ownmost potentiality for being (the professor's as well as that of the students) . Thus, it is on the way to Being that this joint venture of reading Aristotle under Heidegger's direction, as a search for the "conceptuality of the basic concepts"– the "from which" and "toward which" of the philosophical tradition – leads us.